Coordinating Attention: The Unintended Consequences of FOMC Press Conferences
In an effort to increase transparency, the Chair of the Federal Reserve now holds a press conference following some, but not all, Federal Open Market Committee announcements. Press conferences are scheduled independently of economic conditions and communicate little additional information relative to the announcements. Using media coverage and Google searches, we show that investors shift attention away from announcements without press conferences. This inattention hinders the Fed's attempts to coordinate market expectations and therefore prevents effective monetary policy. Consequently, evidence from equity and derivative markets demonstrates that investors lower their expectations of major policy actions on days without press conferences.
Inverted Fee Venues and Market Quality
Stock exchanges incentivize the demand and supply of liquidity through their fee models. A traditional model pays a rebate to the liquidity supplier and an inverted model pays a rebate to liquidity demanders. We examine the impact of inverted fee models on market quality using an exogenous shock to inverted venue market share created by a regulatory intervention – the 2016 Tick Size Pilot. We show higher inverted venue share improves pricing efficiency, increases liquidity and decreases volatility. Our findings suggest that the finer pricing grid provided by inverted venues encourages competition between liquidity providers and improves market quality.
Double Bonus? Implicit incentives in Mutual Funds with Explicit Performance Fee
With Juan Sotes-Paladino
Using a unique dataset of performance-fee mutual funds, we examine the interaction between indirect and direct incentives in the asset management industry. A comparison of the flow-performance relationships of performance-fee and non-performance-fee funds reveals that funds with direct incentives face similar-to-steeper indirect incentives. The responsiveness of flows to top performance falls with the level of asymmetric performance fees, making total incentives less convex. Conversely, flows are more sensitive to top performance for funds with more concave fee schedules, making total incentives less concave. Altogether, our findings suggest that investors favor steep but linear compensation schedules for their fund managers. Our results shed new light on the contracting relation between delegating investors and their portfolio managers.
Indexers and Comovement
I introduce a general equilibrium model with active investors and indexers. Indexing causes market segmentation, and the degree of segmentation is a function of the relative wealth of indexers in the economy. Shocks to this relative wealth induce correlated shocks to discount rates of index stocks. The wealthier indexers are, the greater the resulting comovement is. I confirm empirically that S&P 500 stocks comove more with other index stocks and less with non-index stocks, and that changes in passive holdings of S&P 500 stocks predict changes in comovement of index stocks.